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As an institution deriving from the most fundamental of religious teachings,
the family unit contains strong moral underpinnings which have long
served to substantiate its importance within a legal framework:
In virtually all societies, families are considered the cornerstone of society, for
security, economic and, of course, procreation reasons . . . The importance of
the family as the basic unit of society . . . (is) . . . embedded in most cultures, in
traditions, prescriptions, laws and religious teaching.1
It is thus not surprising that international instruments such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights speak of the family as 'the natural and
fundamental group unit of society . . . entided to protection by society
and the State' (Article 16.3), and that a host of other legal instruments,
both universal and regional, similarly uphold the sanctity of the family
and its right to protection. An obligation to protect families is also found
in, among other treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Article 23 (1)), the American Convention on Human Rights
(Article 17(1)), the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Article
18(1)), the European Social Charter (Article 16) and the International
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 10).2 Although
the European Convention on Human Rights3 does not specifically mention
'protection,' the obligation to protect families is succinct: Article 8 of this
convention containing, among other things, a right of respect for family
life has been the basis of much case law development on the obligation
of protection.4
On a domestic level, the constitutions of at least 50 countries provide for
family protection.5 In countries where no specific constitutional provision
exists, protection is often present. Although the US Constitution has no
express provision on family rights, the Supreme Court has stated that '(i)f
any freedom not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights enjoys a
"preferred position" in the law, it is most certainly the family.'6 In its
case law the Court has noted, '(O)ur decisions establish that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition.'7 That the family unit comprises an integral part of the US
constitutional system has also been stressed by scholars: '(O)ur political
system is superimposed on and presupposes a social system of family
units, not just of isolated individuals. No assumption more deeply underlies
our society .. . '"
In light of the foregoing, one might expect that families 'in need' could
count on legal protection on both a domestic and international level.
However, one does not have to look far to realize that this proliferation
of honour and protection is rather transparent in practice, particularly
when viewed in the context of families which, for varying reasons, have
been separated by flight or migration and are now seeking to reunite.
For one thing, there is no unified approach regarding a right to family
unity or what family protection encompasses. Furthermore, despite
recognition of the family unit, its significance and its need for protection,
obstacles to family reunification are deep-rooted and manifold.
This article focuses on the current situation regarding the right to
2
 Cvetic, C , 'Immigration Cases in Strasbourg: The Right to Family Life under Article 8 of the
European Convention', 36 /CZQ.647, 653 (1987). For further discussion, see Plender, R., International
Migration Law, (2nd rev. ed., 1988), 365-72. The obligation of protection has been recognized as a
'positive obligation', requiring States to take affirmative action to protect families where necessary.
See further below.
3
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4
November 1950, 213 MV75 22I (1950), in force 3 Sept. 1953; ratified by 30 States on I Jan. 1995
(hereinafter European Convention).
The European Court of Justice 'regularly' requires members of the European Community to
comply with this provision. Storey, H., 'The Right to Family Life and Immigration Case Law at
Strasbourg', 39 ICLQ 328, 344 (1990).
5
 Plender, above note 2, at 366-7.
6
 Moon a Cleveland, 431 US 494, 545 (1977).
7
 Moon, 431 US at 540.
8
 Heymann & Barzelay, 'The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics', 53 B.U.L Ren
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family unity in the United States and Europe; it provides a general
overview while delineating some of the more salient problems that have
arisen in connection with family rights and immigration law. The first
part offers a general analysis of the right to family unity as a right of
protection, and considers die sources of this right. This is followed by a
look at how the European Court of Human Rights and the Commission
have dealt widi family unity and by further consideration and comparison
of family unity under US law. Aldiough the European Court and
Commission are not the only judicial bodies dealing with family cases in
Europe, they have considered many related aspects and issues; their
analysis, especially in connection with article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, thus provides a good starting point for
considering the European approach to this subject. A comparative study
is called for precisely because of the effects which newly implemented
and more stringent immigration regulations in bom Europe and the US
are having on the family. Given the growth of immigration problems,
resulting particularly from increasingly restrictive policies and the
tightening of immigration quotas, family reunification is becoming
increasingly difficult; the need for new ideas and approaches is thus more
and more compelling. The article concludes with some proposals for
solutions. More importantly, however, it attempts to access and organize
problems in a critical sense, so as to clear away inconsistencies and
provide a new perspective on where solutions are most urgently needed.
1.1 The right to family unity in general: 'unity' and
'reunification' as aspects of protection
Among the various aspects of the right to family unity, its acceptance as
a right to protection of the family as a unit is fundamental. This manner
of characterizing the right is found not only on a domestic but also on
an international level.9 Beginning with the provisions of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, most international human rights
documents recognize a right of family unity. Family unity has been further
defined as 'a right to recognition of a legal relationship between family
members'.10 The right of unity is often distinguished from the right to
reunification, which extends protection more specifically to families which
have been separated and wish to reunite." Few international human
rights instruments specifically designate a right of family reunification or
otherwise elaborate on how the right to be treated as a unit should be
implemented in cases of separated families. Among these, the Final Act
9
 As one author notes, '(t)he principle of the unity of the family is firmly established in international
law': Perruchoud, R., 'Family Reunification', 27 Int. Mig. 510 (1989).
van Dijk, P. and van Hoof, G.J.H., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human rights,
(2nd ed., 1990).
See, for example, Perruchoud, above note 9, at 511.
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of the Helsinki Conference directly addresses the problems occurring
when family members reside in two different States; however, its provisions
are principally concerned with migrants and emigration, as opposed to
immigration.12
Despite the lack of an express right of reunification, Plender notes that,
at least among industrialized States, there is a policy of allowing the
admission of persons who have been separated from their families ('where
reasonable'): States, he notes, are under a 'certain political or moral
predisposition . . . to conduct their immigration policies so as to avoid
unnecessary disruption to family life'.13 With respect to international
instruments, he remarks that although '(t)aken together (they) do not
amount to evidence of a right to family reunification in general
international law, . . . (they do) . . . establish the widespread acceptance
that States should facilitate admission to their territories of members of
families of citizens or residents, at least when it would be unreasonable
to expect the family to be reunited elsewhere'.14
Also indicative of a policy of reunification are various resolutions
stressing the importance of reunification in connection with the principle
of 'unity'. In 1981, the UNHCR Executive Committee concluded, with
regard to family reunification and refugees, as follows:
In the application of the principle of the unity of the family and for obvious
humanitarian reasons, every effort should be made to ensure the reunification
of separated refugee families .. .
It is hoped that countries of asylum will apply liberal criteria in identifying those
family members who can be admitted with a view to promoting a comprehensive
reunification of the family.'s
Similarly, with regard to refugees and persons otherwise forced to leave
their homelands, the Conclusions of the Thirteenth Round Table of the
Institute of Humanitarian Law have stressed reunification in connection
with unity:
The humanitarian principle of family reunification is firmly established in
international practice . . .
This principle is closely linked to the right of unity of the family which recognizes
that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State . . .
. . . there exist different situations where families need to be reunited, and
12
 Plender, above note 2, at 365. For additional instruments mentioning reunification, see
Perruchoud, above note 9, at 510-11.
13
 Render, above note 2, at 374-5.
14
 Ibid, at 366.
15
 Conclusion No. 24 (XXXII) Family Reunification, UNHCR Executive Committee, 32nd
Session (1981), I, 5.
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solutions must be reached in accordance with relevant international law and the
requirements of the particular situation.""
The emphasis placed upon the role of reunification in connection with
unity, despite the lack of an express right of reunification, illustrates the
first wrinkle in this area of the law: On the one hand, family reunification
calls for the movement of persons from one State to another. On the
other hand, outside of specific bilateral or multilateral treaties, there is
no right to immigrate and no general duty on the part of States to allow
persons to enter their territories.17 Although, practically speaking, family
reunification 'should be considered as a means of implementing the
principle of family unity .. .',18 under general international law it is merely
a policy the force of which is vague and undefined — in effect, a right
of unity without a clear means of executing it.
Recently, the importance of reunification rights and the need for more
specific international provisions regarding them have been increasingly
recognized. For example, it has been proposed that the UN adopt a
specific declaration on the topic, and current literature has suggested that
reunification is closely related to the right to leave and return,19 although
it is clear that a right to leave one country does not automatically lead
to a right to enter another.
The 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, in two consecutive
articles, stresses not only unity but also reunification:
States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her
parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial
review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such
separation is necessary for the best interests of the child . . .
In accordance with the obligation . . . under article 9, paragraph 1 [above],
applications . . . to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family
reunification shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, humane and
expeditious manner .. .m
States nevertheless enjoy extensive discretion here, and increased support
for reunification in law must be considered together with the fact that,
ultimately, the decision as to whether or not to admit a family member
1
 Conclusions on Family Reunification, extract from International Review of the Red Cmss, Nov.-Dec,
1988. (formulated at the Thirteenth Round Table of the International Institute for Humanitarian
Law, San Remo, 6-10 Sept. 1988), Conclusions 1, 2, 3.




 Mubanga-Chipoya, C.L.C., 'The Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, Including his Own
and to Return to his Country. Analysis of the current trends and developments regarding the right
to leave any country including one's own, and to return to one's own country, and some other rights
or considerations arising therefrom', UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/35, 20Jun. 1988, 106.
20
 Arts. 9, 10, 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UNCA res. 44/25, UN
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 166: UN doc. A/44/49 (1990); reprinted in 29 JIM 1448
(1989). In force 2 Sept. 1990 and ratified by 168 States at 1 Jan. 1995.
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is subject to competing interests within individual States, and that there
is no uniform practice.
1.2 European and US approaches to 'unity' and 'reunification'
Both the European Court of Human Rights and the Commission discuss
family unity and reunification within the framework of States' rights or
obligations with regard to the admission and/or deportation of immigrants;
their decisions are based mostly on article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.21 In all cases dealing with the issue of separated
families and their rights to reunite or to remain together (in the face of
deportation), the Court and the Commission have reiterated the general
principle that there is no right to immigrate to another country simply
because one has close family members there. On the other hand, the
obligation to respect and/or protect families proscribes unreasonable or
arbitrary interference with family life.22 Moreover, to a certain extent,
States party to the European Convention give up the right to exclude
whoever they want from their borders;23 and they may have a positive
obligation to take some affirmative action to ensure this protection.24 Thus,
depending upon varying circumstances, explored below, the exclusion of
a person from a country where close family members reside may be
impermissible.
Family reunification is stressed more frequently in the United States,
where there is a tendency in immigration cases to focus on whether a
person should be allowed to enter the country or be excluded.
Reunification is a dominant feature of current arrangements for permanent
immigration into the United States. For example, there is no official limit
on the immigration of immediate relatives of US citizens, and under
the preference system regulating the admission of immigrants, family
sponsored immigration is given top priority.
US immigration legislation, set forth in the Immigration Act of 1990
(or '1990 Act',25 adding to and amending the Immigration and Nationality
Act or 'INA'26) is rife with expressions of legislative concern for family
21
 European Convent ion, above note 3.
22
 T h e Commission has stated that '(e)xpuision of or a refusal to admit a person to a State's
territory resulting in an arbitrary separation o f family members is a violation o f Article 8'. X a
Sweden, App. N o . 4 3 4 / 5 0 , II Y3. Em. Conn on H.R. 354 (1959).
" Abduladi and Balhmdali a United Kingdom 94 Eur.Ct-H.R. (ser. A) (1985) 50 , (hereinafter,
Abdulaaz); This was even earlier adhered to by the Commission; see X a Sweden, above note 22 , at
354; A' a Austria and Yugoslavia, App. No. 2 1 4 2 / 6 4 , VII Y£. Eta. Conn on H.R. 314(1964) ; X a German;,
App. N o . 6 3 1 5 / 7 3 , X V I I Y.B. Em. Cona on HJL 480 (1974).
* See Marckx Case, 31 EUT.CLH.JI (scr. A) (1979). Mankx is frequently cited in subsequent cases
for establishing the positive obligation principle.
25
 Immigration Act o f 1990 (1990 Act), Pub. L. N o . 1 0 1 - 6 4 9 , Sec. 408(a), 104 Stat 4978 (adding
or amending many sections o f the INA) (signed by the President on 29 Nov . 1990).
26
 Immigration and Nationality Act o f 1952 (INA), Pub. L. N o . 8 2 ^ 1 4 , 66 Stat. 163 (McCarran-
Walter Act; codified as amended at 8 U S C Sees. 1101-1524) .
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protection and reunification. Referring to the legislative history of a
specific INA provision granting a special preference status, the US
Supreme Court noted that it 'establishes that Congressional concern was
directed "at the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and
immigrants united".'27 Other references to die Act have spoken of its
'humane purpose . . . to reunite families'28 and have characterized family
reunification as 'one of the foremost polic(ies) underlying the granting of
preference visas under the US immigration laws'.M With regard to US
Supreme Court decisions protecting families from government intrusion,
one author maintains that, at least with respect to parent-child and
spousal relationships, die decisions provide a basis for recognizing a right
to family unification.30 He further notes that,
(i)deally, the courts in... (the US)... should recognize and enforce a constitutional
right to family unification based on the premise that each person admitted as a
permanent resident possesses a basic human right to live a normal family life.11
Notwithstanding the above, family reunification remains a problem for
a large number of persons wishing to immigrate to the United States.
Spouses and children of permanent resident aliens (hereinafter, PRAs)
are subject to unduly long delays before consideration for entry which,
in effect, violates their substantive due process rights to 'lead normal
family lives'.32 There is also a difference in treatment on the basis of
national origin because of numerical ceilings placed on immigration from
different countries. Hence, a right to reunification for PRAs may vary,
depending on the national origin of a spouse or minor child, a procedure
which treads on notions of'fundamental fairness' and 'equal protection'."
Underlying the conflict between the rhetorical support given to families
and family reunification in the US and the practice which keeps many
families apart is the plenary power doctrine, a doctrine rooted in
sovereignty that gives the legislative and executive branches of government
" Fudlo a Bell 430 US 787, 795, n.6 (1977) quoting from H.R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., 7 (1957), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 1957, 2016, 2020.
m
 Kaluki v. District Director, 620 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir., 1980).
s s
 Delgado a LVS, 473 F.Supp. 1343, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), quoting Lou u. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543
(2nd Cir., 1977).
*' Guendelsberger, J., 'Implementing Family Unification Rights in American Immigration Law:
Proposed Amendments', 25 San Diego Law Review 253, 266 (1988).
" Ibid., at 276.
n
 Ibid., at 270. 'Substantive due process', according to Black's Law Dictionary, is basically a
'protection from arbitrary or unreasonable action' as opposed to 'procedural due process', which
consists of 'those safeguards to one's liberty and property mandated by the 14th Amend., US
Constitution ..." Blacki Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1983), 745, 628. As shown below, the distinction
between substance and procedure is difficult and has been criticized as arbitrary in practice,
particularly in connection with immigration matters. See Motomura, H., 'The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights', 92 Columbia Law
Review 1625, 1628ff(1992).
" Guendelsberger, above note 30, at 270.
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broad and exclusive authority to regulate immigration matters. The
relationship between the plenary power and sovereignty doctrines is clear
from the comments of Justice Field in a Supreme Court case, Chae Chan
Ping v. United States,3* decided close to the turn of the century:
The power to exclude aliens is an incident of every sovereign nation . . . If it
could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of
another power. A nation must be able to defend itself against vast hordes of
people crowding in upon us.35
Aldiough the plenary power doctrine does not give Congress unlimited
power to regulate aliens, it can result in their exclusion under conditions
which might otherwise be unconstitutional.36 Thus, as widi the case of
deference to State sovereignty in the Strasbourg cases, family rights in
US immigration matters are limited by a doctrine pursuant to which the
judicial branches defer in applying constitutional standards. A
consideration of the right to family unity in light of the plenary power
doctrine is rife with contradictions, as 'the issue of family rights in the
context of immigration law mixes areas in which the Court has been
most active on the one hand and most deferential on the other in its
exercise of judicial review legislation'.37
Hence, under both US and European laws the right to family unity is
a limited one. It is not only the doctrines of plenary power and State
sovereignty which, in effect, circumscribe the right, but also the
contradictions underlying these notions: That is, on the one hand, there
is an emphasis placed upon the value and importance of families and
family rights, including the right of reunification; on the odier hand,
there is a practice of limiting these rights in an effort to preserve State
autonomy. The ensuing discussion will further examine European and
US practices in connection with the European Convention and the US
Constitution, respectively, and further elucidate the extent to which this
contradiction is carried out.
2. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights
A considerable body of case law regarding die right to family unity in
immigration matters has evolved from Strasbourg. Pursuant to article 8
ECHR, family rights belong to a group of rights which fall within a 'right
to privacy sphere', including, among others, rights of homosexuals,
34
 Chat Chan Ping a United States, 130 U S 581 (1889).
35
 Ib id , at 606.
36
 For further discussion of the plenary power doctrine, see below.
37
 Guendelsberger, above note 30, at 262-3.
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pregnant woman and children.38 The family is granted a 'right of respect'
and a 'right to freedom from interference by a public authority', which
is then circumscribed in paragraph 2 as follows:
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
public health or morals, or for the protection of rights and freedoms of others.39
Article 12 of the Convention, providing for die right to marry and have
a family, as well as article 5 of Protocol No. 7 on spousal equality, are
two further provisions relevant to family life. Article 14, prohibiting sexual
and other forms of discrimination, has also been relied upon together
with article 8.40 This paper focuses on the family life provisions in article
8, although article 12 plays an important role with regard to its specific
rights, or where 'family life' cannot be proven. However, particularly in
immigration matters, article 8 is more commonly invoked because it
offers a wider range of protection.41
The bulk of the relevant case law dealing with family life in immigration
cases has been decided by the European Commission.42 Two important
decisions by the Court — Abdulaziz in 198543 and Berrehab in 198844 —
have, for the most part, followed the direction of the Commission with
some small, albeit important, changes often adhered to in turn by the
Commission.45 Recent deportation cases involving second generation
migrants, notably, Mostaquim^ and Beldjoudi?1 decided by the Court in
1989 and 1990 respectively, are also significant for their discussion of the
ECHR article 8 right to family unity in connection with the deportation
of family members. Despite inconsistencies, some common approaches
in these decisions are worthy of consideration and are described below.
2.1 The 'basic premise'
That there is no 'right to immigrate' and that States are free to choose
who may enter or remain widiin their territories within certain limits
established by rules of international law is so frequendy stated in the
Strasbourg cases that it may be considered a basic premise, serving as a
01
 Connel ly , A .M. , 'P rob lems of Interpretat ion of Article 8 of the European Conven t ion on
H u m a n Rights ' , 35 /CZ.Q.567, 577 (1986).
39
 European Convention, art. 8(2).
40
 See , for example , AbdulacU, above note 23 .
41
 Storey, above note 4, at 341.
4}
 For a comprehensive list of cases, see ibid, at 328-9.
43
 Abdulaoi, above note 23.
44
 Bemhab Case, 138 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (here inaf te r , Bemhab).
>s
 Storey, above note 4, at 328-9 implies that this may be the case or, at least, that the Commission
'assumes' that it follows a similar direction to the Court.
46
 Moustaquim Case, 193 Eur.Ct H . R . (ser. A) (1991) .
47
 Beldjoudi a France, 2 3 4 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1992); d i scussed fu r the r be low .
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rationale by which the Court or Commission place limits on the right to
family unity. Hence, in a case involving the rights of husbands in different
families to immigrate under varying circumstances, the Court said it
could 'not ignore that the present case is concerned not only with family
life but also with immigration and that as a matter of well-established
international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a state has the right
to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory'.48
Case law reveals a conflict between an individual right to family unity
and a State right of sovereignty, with State interests often weighing heavily
in the solution. As one author notes, 'The need to immigrate in order to
fulfil the objective of family unity is in practice overruled by the individual
State's sovereign right to decide who to admit to its territory'.49 Despite
a tendency to give greater weight to State interests, the Court has noted
that the extent of a State's obligation to admit relatives of setded
immigrants to its territory will depend on individual circumstances.
Determining whether an individual has a right to immigrate (or remain)
on the basis of article 8 or whether a State's denial is justified, involves
a balancing of considerations best understood by viewing the approaches
of the Commission and the Court in individual cases.
2.2 The approaches of the Commission and the Court
Two basic approaches are followed by both die Court and the
Commission. At the outset, both involve consideration of whether or not
there is a family or family life under article 8. Thereafter, one approach
considers whether there has been an interference with this family life by
a public authority and, if so, whether it can be justified under article 8(2).
This has been characterized as the 'negative' approach, as States are
required to abstain from any 'unjustified interference'.50 The second
approach, better known as the 'positive obligation' requirement, is often
followed in connection with a lack of efficient State procedures. It requires
States actively to institute procedures or otherwise take positive measures
to meet the requirements of respect for family life. As shown below, this
'positive' approach has important implications for a broader right to
family unity.
2.2.1 Defining 'family'for article 8 purposes
Relations between immediate family members — spouses or parents and
children, 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate' — constitute family life with little
need for extensive inquiry. Outside of the nuclear family, the question of
family life has traditionally been subject to closer scrutiny. It has been
48
 AbdutazU, above note 23, at 34.
19
 Peiruchoud, above note 9, at 512.
50
 Connelly, above note 38, at 570.
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held that '(t)he mere existence of a family relationship is not sufficient for
the applicability of Article 8 . . . , ' and that some examination of the
relationship invoked by an applicant, ie. whether there is a 'sufficiently
close factual tie,' or a 'genuine tie,' is necessary in all Article 8 matters.51
Thus, the existence of a family for Article 8 purposes depends upon proof
of certain 'ties' which, in turn, depends upon the nature of a given
relationship.52 While diese 'ties' are generally assumed for close family
relations (ie. nuclear family members) unless proven otherwise,
'genuineness' in other relationships depends upon a variety of factual
circumstances ranging from whether or not the concerned persons shared
the same household53 to a consideration of economic dependency.54 Of
course, once a nuclear family has separated, be it for reasons of forced
flight, migration, or even divorce, the family relationship will also be
subject to an examination of 'genuineness'.
Thus, it is the social as opposed to the legal family which is relevant at
the outset in the Strasbourg decisions. Both the Court and the Commission
support the view that 'States should not define family for family
reunification purposes by reference to "unyielding genealogical rules",
. . . (and maintain that). . . (t)he definition should be based on fact'.55 The
Commission has stated that 'family life to be considered is . . . de facto
family life,'56 and both Court and Commission have maintained that 'the
fact of birth, ie. biological ties between modier and child . . . creates
family life in the sense of Article 8'; thus, protection is given to illegitimate
children.57 Adopted children and parents are also considered to be a
family.58 In Marckx v. Belgium, the Court held that 'ties between near
relatives . . . ' such as grandparents and grandchildren comprise family
life 'since such relatives may play a considerable part in family life'.59
The Commission has maintained that close de facto relationships which
do not have the necessary legal characteristics for 'family life' may be
51
 van Dijk and van Hoof, above note 10, at 379 (relying, in part, on Marckx, above note 24 and
Bemhab, above note 44).
52
 Ibid., at 380.
" See, for example, X a Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 3110/67, T.B. Eur, Com. H.R. XI
(1968) 449 (518); Tu Switzerland, App. Nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76, TB. Eur. Com on H.R. XX (1977)
372 (408-10).
54
 See X a United Kingdom, App . N o . 8 1 5 7 / 7 8 , (not published)
55
 Render, R., 'Introductory Report on Human Rights of Aliens in Europe in Council of Europe',
Division of Human Rights, Human Rights of Aliens in Europe, (1985), 49.
56
 XandYv. United Kingdom, App. N o . 5 3 0 2 / 7 1 , Coll. 4 4 (1973) 29.
van Dijk a n d van Hoof, above note 10, a t 378 . Suppor t for these content ions is d r awn from
the Marckx case, above note 24; see also the opinion of the Commiss ion (and cases ment ioned
therein), Marckx a Belgium, App . No . 6 8 3 3 / 7 4 , X V I I I Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. (1975) 248, 270.
58
 X a France, App . No . 9 9 9 3 / 8 2 , 31 Dec. & Rep. 241 (1983).
59
 Marckx, above note 24, a t 2 1 .
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covered under the right to respect for private life in article 8(1).60 Thus,
other 'family-like' relationships, not considered 'family' in a traditional
sense), such as those between homosexuals or foster parents and children,
may fall under the private life provision of article 8.61 Traditional European
conceptions of family are not always decisive; even polygamous families
have been granted a right to protection;62 however, States are by no
means obligated to accept the practice of polygamy. On the other hand,
'extra-marital relationships may raise issues of family life, provided that
the persons live together on a permanent basis and keep house jointly'.63
Cohabitation and financial independence have been factors considered
apart from blood relationships; in some cases, the absence of these
elements has resulted in the exclusion of complaints involving adult
children,64 siblings,65 grandchildren,66 and other extended family members,
as well as adoptive children.67
In Abdulaziz and Bemkab,68 two leading family cases, the Court
demonstrated a more liberal approach than previously with regard to its
treatment of family life. In Abdulaziz, concerning the question whether a
State's refusal to allow non-national male spouses (and spouses-to-be) of
women 'lawfully settled' in the State to reside in its territory constituted
a violation of article 8,69 the Court held, among other things, that family
life could be extended to include 'intended' family life, that is, fiance(e)
or marriages subject to validity problems):
Whatever else the word family may mean, it must at any rate include the
relationship that arises from a lawful and genuine marriage, such as that
60
 Raymond, J., La Suisse devant les otgana de la C.E.D.H. (Switzerland and the Organs of the
European Convention on Human Rights) (Basel, 1979), 82. Art. 8(1) ECHR provides that '(e)veryone
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence'. For an in-
depth discussion of the protection of private life, see Cohen-Jonathan, C , 'Respect for Private and
Family Life', in R. St. J . Macdonald, F. Matscher, H. Petzold eds., The European System JOT the Protection
of Human Rights, (1993), 405, 4 0 6 - 9 .
61
 Regarding homosexuals, see, for example, X a the United Kingdom, App. No. 7525 /78 , 11 Dec.
& Rep. 117 (1981); on foster parents, see, X V. Switzerland, App. No. 8257/78 , 13 Da. & Rep. 248
(1978).
62
 Kahn a U.K., App. No. 2 9 9 1 / 6 6 , X Y.B. Em. Conu on H.R. (1967) 478.
63
 X & r a Switzerland, App. Nos. 7289 /75 and 7349/76 , X X T.B. Eia Com on H.R. (1977) 372,
408.
64
 5 & S a U.K., App. No . 10375/83 , 40 Dec. & Rep. 196 (1984).
65
 Famify X a U.K., App. No . 9 4 9 2 / 8 1 , 30 Da. & Rep. 232 (1982).
66
 UppaleL al. o U.K., App. No . 8244 /78 , \ 7 Dec. & Rep. 149 (1979).
67
 X & To. UK, App. N o . 7 2 2 9 / 75, 12 Dec. & Rep. 32 (1977); for additional decisions concerning
these categories, see Storey, above note 4, at 329, notes 8 - 1 4 and opinions cited therein. These
decisions are often closely tied to the facts of the individual case: cf. X a France, App. N o . 9 9 9 3 / 8 2 ,
31 Dec. & Rep. 241 (1983) where relations between adoptive parent and adoptive child are covered
by art 8.
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 Abdulaziz, above note 23 ; Bemhab, above note 44 .
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 Abdulaziz, above, note 2 3 , at 31 . More precisely, the Court stressed that die applicants were
'complaining not of being refused leave to enter or remain in the U K but, as persons lawfully setded
in diat country, of being deprived . . . or threatened with deprivation . . . , of the society o f their
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contracted by Mr. and Mrs. Abdulaziz and Mr. and Mrs. Balkandali, even if a
family life of the kind referred to by the Government has not been fully
established. Those marriages must be considered sufficient to attract such respect
as may be due under Article 8.70
And, with more specific regard to the validity of a marriage contracted
outside the United Kingdom,
The Court does not consider that it has to resolve the difference of opinion that
has arisen concerning the effect of Philippine law. Mr. and Mrs. Cabales had
gone through a ceremony of marriage . . . and the evidence before the Court
confirms diat diey believed themselves to be married and that they genuinely
wished to cohabit and lead a normal family life. And indeed they subsequendy
did so. In the circumstances, the committed relationship thus established was
sufficient to attract the application of Article 8."
In Berrehab, concerning the right of a divorced father to avoid deportation
because of his close relationship with his daughter, lack of cohabitation
did not prevent the Court from finding a family life in view of the
circumstances:
It follows from the concept of family on which Article 8 is based that a child
born of such a union (viz. a lawful and genuine marriage) is 'ipso jure' part of
the relationship; hence, from the moment of the child's birth and by the very
fact of it, there exists between him and his parents a bond amounting to 'family
life', even if the parents are not then living together.72
Although the Court acknowledged that subsequent events could interrupt
this bond, it considered the relationship between this applicant and his
daughter as one rich with elements that bound them such that the 'ties
of family life' were not upset by a lack of cohabitation. Despite the
parents' divorce, the father made frequent and regular visits to his
daughter, contributed to her education and otherwise acted in a manner
evincing die persistence of a sound family relationship.
Berrehab and Abdulaziz have contributed to a broader notion of family
life. Referring to them, one audior has summarized the definition of
family for future article 8 interpretation as follows:
. . . (T)he existence or non-existence of family life remains a question of fact
depending upon the real existence of close personal ties. But to examine this
question requires a more organic approach. This approach views family life in
die round as a process with normal stages of development. At the centre, the
family relationship of natural parent and child is pre-eminent. The concept can
cover intended family life between couples. It can also cover ties persisting after
'" Abduladi, above note 23, at 32.
" Ibid., at 33.
72
 Btmhab, above note 44 at 14.
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the breakdown of marriages (and) 'future relations' between a natural parent
and a child may also be a proper focus.73
It is clear that the biological child-parent relationship and the traditional
husband-wife one are fundamental for family life. Thereafter, in certain
circumstances (for example, 'the existence of close personal ties'), the
elements required for a family relationship may be broadened or, when
the legal structure necessary for a family is lacking, a given relationship
may be protected under article 8's private life provision. As the notion
of family is, in itself, an evolving one and highly susceptible to changes
in society's morals and values, this approach seems practical; a flexible,
as opposed to a rigid definition, is clearly necessary to meet new and
developing notions of family.7.4 Nevertheless, care must also be taken to
avoid an overly broad description and to prevent the loss of a true and
clear definition as this would be to the detriment of diose seeking
protection.
2.3 Interference: Elsewhere versus the connections approach
Until recendy, it was generally held that an interference which violated
article 8 is one which prevents the enjoyment of family life elsewhere.
According to this theory, sometimes referred to as the 'elsewhere
approach,' expulsion or exclusion of a family member is legitimate if
other family members can follow and if this can be 'reasonably expected'
of them.75 A determination of reasonableness involves weighing the
advantages and disadvantages to the concerned individual against the
interests of the State served by its immigration policy.76 Criteria of
relevance for deciding if there are obstacles to living elsewhere include,
among others, consideration of one's ties with the State denying entry;77
links with the foreign country;78 and the economic consequences of
removal to another country.79 Among these, emphasis is placed on one's
connections to a State: If an applicant has resided in a country for a
considerable time and has founded a family there, it is more likely that
73
 Storey, above note 4, at 334—5; on 'future relations,' see case cited ibid., at 335 .
74
 A flexible approach is also needed in exclusion cases where, due to a forced separation, there
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partner and children have good reasons for not leaving.80 Similarly, it
has been held that a prohibition of entry measure, 'can . . . only be
considered as interfering with a persons private or family life where the
private and family life of that person is firmly established in the
territory .. .""
This manner of characterizing an interference is unique: With regard
to almost any other basic right, an interference would constitute a
restriction or limitation on that right. As is explained further below, the
'elsewhere approach' is problematic for a number of reasons and has
been subject to much criticism. Among other things, it discriminates
against couples of mixed nationality, and it is a difficult test because its
determination is easily subject to varyingjudicial opinion. Not surprisingly,
some Strasbourg cases, particularly more recent ones, have emphasized
one's connections to a given territory and ignored the issue of obstacles
to resuming family life elsewhere.82 The Court has evidenced a somewhat
inconsistent approach with regard to the issue of interference. In Abdulaziz,
it held that a lack of respect for family life could be sufficient for an
article 8 violation without examining the question of interference.83
Subsequently, in Berrehab, the Court returned to the interference criteria,
but stressed the connection factors (ties between father and child) while
giving little attention to the 'elsewhere approach'.84 One might speculate
that the different approach here was because Berrehab dealt with a
threatened deportation while Abdulaziz concerned the question of
immigration. Still, it seems significant that the applicant in Berrehab had
lived in the country for a considerable period of time, had employment,
close family relations and was otherwise 'established' there.85
The different directions taken by both the Court and the Commission
in determining whether there has been an interference indicate the need
for re-examining and refining the current procedures. At the moment, it
is difficult to say precisely how an interference will be decided in a family
immigration matter. However, the fact that greater emphasis was given
to connections as opposed to the elsewhere approach in both the Abdulaziz
and Berrehab judgments represents an innovative approach which may be
indicative of a new trend. Storey has suggested that because of the
"" X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6357 /73 , 1 Dec. & Rep. 77 (1975). See also Alam a
U.K., App. No. 2991/66, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conu. H.R. 478 (fact that a rather had a long history as a
'permanent settler' was a decisive factor in an admissibility decision).
"' XandYa. Switzerland, App. Nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76, 9 Dec. & Rep. 57, 74 (1977).
82
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problems inherent in the 'elsewhere approach', it might be better to get
rid of it entirely and focus only on connections:
By starting from a conception of'family life' as an organic process, the connections
approach is able to avoid the internal inconsistencies to which the elsewhere
approach is prey . . . Giving more play to connections would not . . . mean
viewing the Convention as guaranteeing 'family life' rights to the fullest extent.
But it would more safely ensure that the role of the Convention went beyond
mere preservation of such rights in their barest forms.86
2.4 Justifiable interference
If an interference is found, a further inquiry is made into the possibility
of its justification under article 8, paragraph 2. Justification, in turn,
depends upon whether the interference is 'necessary in a democratic
society' in pursuance of one of the legitimate aims specified. These
include, 'the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others'.87
An interference with article 8 rights must not only be justified by a
pressing social need, but must also be 'proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued'.88 The Commission and the Court apply a balancing formula
here, between 'elements concerning respect for family life . . . (and, among
other things,) . . . considerations relating to the proper enforcement of
immigration controls'."" A tendency to find a connection between correct
immigration practices and 'the prevention of . . . disorder' has been
prevalent in the case law.90 In Berrehab, the Court went so far as to note
that a State's economic well-being within the meaning of article 8(2)
could be a 'legitimate aim' on die basis of government concern over
'population density or the need to 'regulate the labour market'.91 However,
even such a legitimate aim must be in proportion to the measures taken
to achieve it. The deportation of the applicant father in the Berrehab case
was a serious interference with family life; die government's economic
interests, although legitimate, did not justify the interference.
Factors which come into play in die process of 'balancing' include die
severity of the crime (when relevant), the obstacles to following the family
member who is expelled or refused entry and, in cases involving married
couples, die applicant's awareness of die risks involved at die dme of die
86
 Storey, above note 4 , at 338.
87
 European Convent ion, art. 8(2).
88
 Betdjoudi, above note 47 , at 27
89
 X a U.K., App. N o . 8 2 4 5 / 7 8 , 24 Dec. & Rep. 98 , 100 (1981); Bemhab, above note 44; For
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911
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marriage. Hence, in X & Y v. Federal Republic of Germany, the deportation
of a US Citizen married to a German national (with a child) owing to a
conviction for dealing heroin was not an article 8 violation. Although
there was an interference, it was 'in accordance with law and necessary
in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder and crime'.92 In
another case applying this same rationale, the Commission upheld the
deportation of a Pakistani citizen for 'defying' immigration controls. In
addition to its finding that X, who had a spouse and children in the
United Kingdom, was aware of the risks involved when he contracted
his marriage, the Commission found no 'insurmountable obstacles' to the
wife and children following him to Pakistan.93 Finally, with regard to the
balancing formula, the Commission concluded that, 'there are no elements
concerning respect for family life which might outweigh valid
considerations relating to the proper enforcement of immigration
control'.94
2.4.1 Second-generation migrant cases
Recent deportation cases involving second-generation migrants accused
of criminal acts have regarded expulsion as a severe penalty warranted
only under the most extreme circumstances.95 On first impression, it
seems that the nature of the crimes involved may play a role here.
However, a closer reading indicates that the Court and/or Commission
heavily considered the overall situation of the applicants with respect to
both their individual and family situations (that is, their ties) within the
excluding State and the possibilities for continuing a comparable life-style
elsewhere.
Moustaquim, a Belgian case, involved an applicant who had committed
147 offences, including robberies and thefts. The Court's conclusion
that his deportation was not justified or 'proportionate to the . . . aim
pursued,' was based on his individual circumstances. Among other things,
the applicant, although a Moroccan national, had lived in Belgium since
before the age of two, residing with or close to his family (his parents
and seven siblings). During this time, he made few visits to Morocco and
9J
 Xand Ta the Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 7816/77, 9 Dec. & Rep. 219, 221 (1977).
93
 X u. United Kingdom, App. No. 9088/80, 28 Dec. & Rep. 160, 162 (1982).
* Ibid.
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 MousUuntim, above note 46; Beldjmidi, above note 47. For in-depth discussion of these and similar
cases, see Cholewinski, R., 'Strasbourg's 'Hidden Agenda? The Protection of Second-Generation
Migrants from Expulsion under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights', 12 Net.
Q.H.R. 287 (1994). Cholewinski defines second-generation migrants as persons who 'have resided in
a country for a considerable period of time, without obtaining . . . citizenship (in) that country': ibid.,
288. The second generation migrant cases suggest a more liberal direction and propose a standard
comparable to the 'extreme hardship' standard applied in US deportation matters, on which see
below. See also Nam a France, Eur. Ct, H.R. (Council of Europe, July 1995) and The Chahal Farmty
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received all his schooling in French.96 That family life elsewhere would
be extremely difficult for him was corroborated by a doctor's report
confirming that the applicant suffered from depression during an earlier
period of deportation because of the disruption of family ties. With regard
to the crimes committed, the Court stressed these had 'special features,'
including that they had been committed while the applicant was a minor.97
In Beldjoudi, involving a threatened deportation to Algeria, the
applicant's criminal record was more serious than Moustaquim's.
Neverdieless, on balance, his ties to France outweighed the interests
involved in his deportation. He had lived in France for 41 years, had
most of his family there and had been married to a French woman for
half of this time. Examining die possibilities for family life elsewhere, the
Court agreed with the claim that expulsion would mean that the wife
would be forced to live in a country where she had no substantial cultural
contacts. This latter factor, constituting a 'serious interference,' led the
Court to conclude that the intended expulsion 'might . . . imperil the
unity or even the very existence of the marriage'.9"
In both the latter cases, the Court ultimately concluded that the
governmental aims pursued were 'legitimate'; however, in light of the
individual circumstances, the deportations were not proportionate to these
aims and thus would, if executed, violate the applicants' article 8 rights.
A similar analysis was maintained in June and July 1995, when the
Commission and the Court, respectively, gave two further decisions
concerning article 8 and the deportation of second generation migrants.99
In both cases, the threatened deportation was not proportionate to the
legitimate aim of the State and thus not justifiable as 'necessary in a
democratic society' under article 8(2).
In Ckahal,100 the applicants comprised an entire family who alleged that
a threatened deportation of one member would, among odiers, violate
the article 8 rights of all family members. The main applicant was an
Indian citizen who had resided in the United Kingdom for 19 years and
established a family there. The government wished to deport him on
national security grounds because of his alleged political involvement and
activities as a 'Sikh militant'.101 The Commission held that a deportation
would violate article 8. Despite criminal charges, the applicant had not
been convicted of a serious crime. His wife had also resided in die United
Moustaqvim, above note 4 6 , at 14.
97
 Ibid., at 8, 19.
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101
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Kingdom for about 19 years and his two children were born there.
Although he had family in India, die Commission was convinced diat if
returned, there was a 'strong risk' that he would be arrested and detained
and 'some risk' that he would be otherwise 'ill-treated'. This latter
circumstance weighed heavily in die Commission's decision, as it noted
that because of the risks involved, 'the deportation of the first applicant
would almost certainly lead to a permanent break up of die family'.102
In Nasri,m die threatened deportation was based on a gang-rape
conviction. The severity of such a crime and the direat it posed to public
order was not questioned. However, there were extenuating circumstances,
among them die fact that the applicant was deaf and dumb since birth,
although capable of minimal comprehension and communication with
family and friends, and, because of inadequate schooling, a complete
illiterate. For die Court, such circumstances heightened the importance
of the family widi whom the applicant had always lived. Also significant
was that all the applicant's schooling occurred in the expelling country,
and that he could not understand die language of the country to which
he would be deported.
Considered together, the second generation migrant cases confirm that
under the European Convention on Human Rights, family ties and an
individual's connections to an expelling State weigh heavily in deportation
matters. Although the 'elsewhere approach' has not been abandoned, it
seems to play a less significant role. More importandy, these cases establish
a pattern whereby, in particular circumstances, State interests, although
acknowledged as 'legitimate,' do not override competing individual
interests.
Similar reasoning has not been followed in cases where deportation
was not at issue. In Abdulaziz, for example, the Court did not look into
the hardships involved for a United Kingdom resident originally from
Malawi to follow her spouse to Portugal, despite the fact that she also
had close family in the UK, spoke no Portuguese and had no other
significant connections to Portugal. Even diough deportation was not an
issue in Abdulaziz, the European Commission and European Court of
Human Rights have been criticized for taking a somewhat inconsistent
approach in die article 8 cases.104 On the other hand, in deportation
cases involving second-generation migrants, there is a fairly constant
tendency to look at die 'whole picture' widi regard to an applicant's
family situation widiin die excluding State; and, in many (but not
all) cases, to examine further die possibilities for family life elsewhere.
Consideration of whedier or not the obstacles to living elsewhere are
102
 Ibid., at 29. The Commission's conclusion that a deportation would involve an art. 3 violation
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'insurmountable' may also depend upon the existence and extent of family
connections in the excluding State.105
Although the notion of family and family ties are stressed in these
cases, the approach in deportation matters sometimes gives greater
consideration to individual roots developed in the country of residence,
as opposed to family life, when weighing these against the aims of
the deporting authorities. As one author notes, in deciding whether a
deportation is necessary in a given society, more attention tends to be
given to such elements as schooling, social ties, culture and language
differences resulting in a conclusion based on the status of the individual.
Because of the length of time such persons have resided in the expelling
State, they may, in effect, be treated as de facto citizens.106
In some cases, it is difficult to determine the relevance of family life.
One might speculate that the family rights of a repeated offender who
has seldom lived at home are not violated when he is forced to return to
his country of origin. The family of such a person may not be terribly
concerned about his or her removal, although, of course, the opposite
may also be true. More importantly, however, regardless of whether the
underlying considerations are related to the family or the individual,
another aspect must be taken into account. When a person has lived in
a country for a long time, grown up in the culture and its language,
studied, worked there, and has no real or substantial connection with the
country of origin, there can be no legitimate reason to send him or her
back; it is also not reasonable or fair to force the other country to receive
such a person. This situation is illustrated in the following comment from
Beldjoudi v. France:
I think that expulsion, especially (as in the present case) to a country where
living conditions are markedly different from those in the expelling country and
where the deportee, as a stranger to the land, its culture and its inhabitants,
runs the risk of having to live in almost total isolation, constitutes interference
with his right to respect for his private life.107
The penalty of expulsion and its consequences for the individual who
has lived all or most of his or her life in the expelling country is clearly
extreme. Nevertheless, the severity of a loss of family life and its significance
not only for the deportee but also for the family members left behind
105
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should not be minimized. When close family members are unreasonably
or unjustly prevented from reuniting or forced to leave a country, it is
often the entire family that suffers. In this connection, the 1989 Convention
on the Rights of the Child is relevant, as an interference with family life
may result in a violation of its provisions ensuring that a child, 'shall not
be separated from (its) parents'.108 When considering the effect of a
potential separation of family members, it is thus essential to look beyond
the individual loss or harm and consider its significance for the entire
family. There are reasons why the drafters of article 8 provided separately
for both private and family life; it would be erroneous to minimize the
importance of the latter provision, or to blend the two together.
2.5 Positive obligations
As opposed to asking if there has been an 'interference' with family life,
the 'positive obligation' approach asks whether a State must, in the
circumstances, take some positive steps to protect family life under article
8. It has evolved from efforts to give meaning to the notion of 'respect'
and its requirements vary. As noted by the Court in Abdu.laz.iz, 'the extent
of a state's obligation to admit to its territory relatives of settled immigrants
will vary according to the particular circumstances of the persons
involved'.109
In many of the cases which have applied this approach, States are
directed to implement procedures necessary to protect family life. Thus,
for example, it has been held that the notion of 'respect' for family life
obliges contracting States to create effective means by which an applicant
claiming to be the father of a child could establish his biological tie,""
while in another matter, a State was required to create procedures
enabling couples to separate.1"
The first clear statement regarding the requirement of positive action
by States was in Marckx,U2 which called for the termination of State
procedures that discriminated against illegitimate children. In Marckx, the
Court described the positive obligation as one which may arise in addition
to the requirement that States abstain from arbitrary interference."3 It
also held that the requirement of respect for family life implied an
obligation that States 'allow those concerned to lead a normal family
life', and 'render possible as from the moment of birth the child's
integration in his family'."4 This comment has provided grounds for a
108
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broader interpretation of article 8, particularly with regard to its
implications for marriages between citizens and non-nationals and the
general rule that States are not obliged to grant non-nationals a right to
stay in such cases."5
Applying the positive obligation approach in Abdulaziz, the Court gave
reasons for confirming the State's denial of entry under article 8, including,
among others, that the applicants had failed to present sufficient evidence
of obstacles to living elsewhere, and that, at the time of their marriage,
they were aware of the risk that their spouses might not obtain permanent
residence status. The Court held that, in the circumstances, the State
was not under a positive obligation to secure family life in a preferred
country of residence."6 It did not discuss the effects on family life for
those refused permission and whether this might be an interference
warranting justification under article 8(2). Despite its findings with respect
to article 8, the Court concluded that the respondent State's denial of
status was unlawful: Because male immigrants were expressly given easier
access to bring in their spouses than females, there was a clear case of
sexual discrimination as a result of which the Court found a violation of
article 8 together with article 14."7
Although it took a rather conservative approach here with respect to
positive obligations, the Court left a door open for subsequent decisions
involving similar issues by noting that, 'there may be circumstances in
which a contracting State should admit to its territory the spouse of a
settled immigrant in order to secure to the couple effective enjoyment of
their family life'."8 This reinforces a broader interpretation of the positive
obligation requirement originally set forth in the Marckx decision. It
implies that a State should take whatever action is needed to promote
human welfare and dignity and represents a 'social view of human rights'
in which the State plays a major role;"9 however, it is the family, as
opposed to the State, which receives precedence. It has been proposed
that the positive obligation approach may, together with recent case law
developments, eventually lead to full application of the right to respect
115
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for family life for marriages between citizens and non-nationals.120 Because
it is an obligation which, in some circumstances, gives greater significance
to families than countervailing State interests, it may also have positive
implications for future family reunification issues.
3. The right to family unity in the United States of
America
3.1 Historical overview: plenary power and family unity
A constitutionally protected right to freedom from State interference with
family life is well established in the US Supreme Court's case law.121
Although aliens do not enjoy the same degree of protection as citizens,
they have not traditionally been denied family rights. From early on, US
courts have recognized, with the exception of Congressional intent to the
contrary, that a right to family unity is a 'natural right':
. . . a Chinese merchant who is entitled to come into and dwell in the United
States is thereby entitled to bring with him, and have with him, his wife and
children. The company of the one, and the care and custody of the other, are
his by natural right: and he ought not to be deprived of either, unless the
intention of Congress to do so is clear and unmistakable.122
Historically speaking, the US approach to the issue of family rights in
connection with immigration matters has varied. Close to the turn of this
century, the plenary power doctrine, which limits judicial authority in
immigration matters and transfers it to legislative and executive branches,
replaced an earlier period of broader respect for aliens' rights.123 This
power of Congress to regulate immigration is considered as a power
incident to State sovereignty; it specifically empowers the legislature 'to
regulate the entry and stay of aliens as well as the process through which
aliens become naturalized citizens .. .'l24 As shown below, however,
congressional power over the admission of aliens, although broad and
characterized as 'absolute', is not without limitation, particularly when
Congress sets procedures which do not comply widi due process or
'minimum standards of fairness'.
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At its height, the plenary power doctrine was responsible for extensive
limitations on judicial review in matters in matters affecting non-nationals,
resulting in greater restrictions on aliens' rights. This sometimes had
repercussions for citizens, for if Congress had reasons so to regulate, even
they could be deprived of close family. The 1924 Immigration Act, for
example, prohibited the unification of children and spouses of Asian
origin with their citizen or resident alien parents or spouses.125
A system imposing numerical limitations on immigrants was first
developed by Congress in the early 1920s. Initially, it only afforded the
possibility for family unification to a few classes of citizens and residents.
Following the Second World War, the possibilities for family unification
improved for both aliens and citizens, although '(a) distinction between
the treatment of relatives of citizens and relatives of permanent resident
aliens remains fundamental in current immigration law.'126
Because of judicial deference to Congress in immigration matters,
constitutional claims to family unity (first brought in the 1950s) have
seldom succeeded. Earlier cases were rejected with little explanation. In
US ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy,1" the exclusion of the wife of a US citizen
on grounds related to national security was upheld without consideration
of the rights of the US citizen spouse. In a later case, it was alleged that
the deportation of a resident alien spouse would violate due process rights
by 'potentially' destroying a marriage. The Court disagreed, holding that
although the marriage was burdened, it was not destroyed and noting
further that the residing spouse had the option to follow.128
Since the early 1970s, the force of the plenary power doctrine has
lessened as judicial intervention, though still limited, has increased where
the constitutional rights of aliens are at issue.129 Notwithstanding
heightened attention to the issue of family unity, the plenary power
doctrine has continued to dominate, as illustrated in Fiallo v. Bell:
At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry
into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that 'over
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than
it is over' the admission of aliens. Our cases 'have long recognized the power
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute . . . largely immune
from judicial control'.130
Decided in the late 1970s, Fiallo has continued to be a leading case for
125
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 Ibid., at 2 5 6 ; see also Noel a Chapman, 5 0 8 F.2d 1023 (2nd Cir., 1975), cert, denied, 4 2 3 U S
824 (1975).
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 Rosenfeld, J., 'Deportation Proceedings and Due Process of Law', 26 CoL H.R. Law Ran 679,
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" Fiallo o Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977) citing, among others, Oceanic Navigation Co. a Stranahan,
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decisions involving distinctions between the rights of aliens and citizens.131
The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an immigration
law which failed to exempt illegitimate alien children from numerical
limitation requirements if they were coming to join their citizen-fathers;
if the same children were joining their citizen-mothers, the exemption
was granted. The petitioners argued that the provision violated due
process and equal protection rights, and that it 'implicated the fundamental
constitutional interests of United States citizens and permanent residents
in a familial relationship'.132 The Court was not persuaded. It upheld the
constitutionality of the statute on the basis of the plenary power doctrine,
stressing the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration matters.
The decision was grounded upon principles of State sovereignty:
We are dealing here with an exercise of the Nation's sovereign power to admit
or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived national interests . . . (L)imits
and classifications as to who shall be admitted are traditional and necessary
elements of legislation in this area.133
In dicta, the Court referred to the legislative history of Congressional
concern with keeping families of citizens and aliens together, and
acknowledged that the statutory provisions in question were aimed at
family reunification.134 Although fathers of illegitimate children are no
longer excluded from preferential treatment, Fiallo remains important for
demonstrating the extent to which the Court has deferred to Congress
in immigration matters. The suggestion that the provision at issue involved
double-barrelled discrimination which implicated constitutional rights
'without furthering legitimate governmental interests'"5 did not override
sovereignty notions, as was the case in Abdulaziz- In the latter case, the
European Court of Human Rights found that exclusion of the husbands
was within the sovereign power of States to set limits on entry, but that
the discriminatory nature of a law which provided no similar exclusion
for the opposite sex was unacceptable. In contrast, the Fiallo Court found
a justification for the legislation, which it noted was anyway not within
the province of the Court to closely examine.136
In applying the plenary power doctrine, the deterrence of fraud and
the underlying aim of limiting the number of immigrants often serve as
justifications for limiting family unification. In Noel v. Chapman,137 a federal
131
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court denied an equal protection challenge to a statutory distinction
between aliens married to citizens and those married to permanent
residents. The court held that a family integrity theory would not support
a constitutional right for resident alien wives to keep their alien husbands
in the US while awaiting US visas, because of the potential for fraud:
. . . the statute had a rational and substantial relationship to the purpose for
which it was enacted — to protect the American economy by discouraging the
arrival of aliens who were coming in large numbers and remaining illegally in
the expectation of a marriage that would assure their continuing residence
here.138
In spite of the plenary power doctrine and the efforts to deter fraud,
family reunification remains a highly valued objective in the US, resulting
in a tension in the law not unlike the conflict existing in European law
between State sovereignty and the rights attaching to family protection.
This is well illustrated in cases following Fwllo. In Kaliski v. District Director,
for example, a federal court emphasized the 'humane purpose of the Act
to reunite families', and held that there was no rational basis for an
arbitrary distinction which detracted from the 'purpose of the Act . . . to
prevent the continued separation of families'.139 Other federal cases have
similarly given more weight to family reunification, noting that it is 'the
most important policy underlying die granting of visas under the US
immigration laws'.140 Hence in some circumstances, family reunification
goals prevail. As in the European cases, there is often a balancing of the
interests involved, together with a consideration of the individual situation.
In many cases, the constitutionality of a statutory condition precedent to
obtaining citizenship is at issue, and the court must determine if there is
a rational basis for such provision.141
3.2 'Family' defined: Legislation and case law
3.2.1 The legislative approach
Immigration into the US is regulated pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) as amended by die Immigration Act of 1990 (1990
Act).142 Pursuant to die 1990 Act, immigrant visas are divided into three
'
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areas: family-based, employment and diversity (reflecting the different
interests behind US immigration policy).143 Significandy, die law contains
no limits on die entry of immediate relatives of US citizens, which includes
children, spouses and parents of US citizens over age 21. Under die 1990
Act, widows and widowers of US citizens married at least two years
before die deadi of dieir spouse are also included, provided diey comply
with filing requirements;144 if diey marry, however, die immediate relative
status terminates. With regard to odier family members (or 'non-
immediate family'), die statute contains a preference system according to
which a designated number of relatives of US citizens and resident aliens
are allowed to enter each year.145
Among odier diings, the 1990 Act provides for an increase in family
based immigration, and it is hoped that the new Act will 'expedite die
reunion of immigrant families in die US' by increasing the number of
family based immigrants in general.146 Thus far, however, its impact has
been minimal in light of the vast numbers of people waiting to join dieir
families in the US.
3.2.2 The judicial approach
Although US courts have yet to define family, die decisions provide a
basis for understanding which relationships will be given protection. The
courts have also filled some of the gaps left open by the legislature. For
example, the term 'spouse,' which is not defined in the immigration laws,
is defined in case law as 'a party to a valid marriage diat has not been
legally terminated'.147 Marriage tends to be defined more in terms of its
validity; generally, a marriage is valid if it was valid at the place of
inception, and it does not violate US public policy. Certain requirements
for a valid marriage have changed, however; cohabitation or a 'viability
test,' for example, are no longer necessary.148
Many cases render a traditional concept of family as 'persons bound
together by marriage and kinship ties'.149 Constitutional protection for
children and spouses is least problematic, although as is die practice of
143
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the European Court and Commission, US courts also examine the existing
relationship, especially that between parent and child: '(T)he extent of
constitutional protection granted to the parent-child relationship depends
on die degree to which the parent accepts some measure of responsibility
for die child's future'.150 It has been argued that constitutional protection
should only be granted when parents have taken part in die responsibilities
of parendiood; however, in exclusion cases, the immigration laws may
be the reason for a lack of contact. Hence, particularly where parents
petition for the entry of a child, it has been suggested mat 'the biological
tie should be sufficient to bring die relationship within those mat are
constitutionally protected'.151 Thus, in Palmer v. Beddy,'52 a US Court
of Appeals construed the INA statute concerning visa preferences for
stepchildren to require only marriage to die natural parent, regardless of
the parent-child relationship. The court criticized the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's approach, which had required a showing of
parental interest, and maintained that no such conditions applied.
Constitutional protection for family members other than parents,
children and spouses is more complicated. For example, it has been held
that there is no constitutional protection for the bond between siblings.153
The court noted here that broadening constitutional protection to cover
family members beyond the parent-child relationship would go too far
and preclude 'a principled way of limiting' such protection for family
relationships. ID4 In other areas, the Supreme Court has granted protection
to de facto parent-child ties. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court
held that a grandmother who filled a parental role was a constitutionally
protected family member. The right to live together as a family went
beyond the nuclear family,
. . . since the Constitution's protection of the sanctity of the family was deeply
rooted in the nation's history and tradition, and since such tradition was not
limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family, but
extended as well to the sharing of their household with uncles, aunts, cousins,
and especially grandparents.155
Although interesting from many aspects with respect to its interpretation
of family and die extent of constitutional protection it is entided to, Moore
involved the rights of citizens as opposed to immigrants. It is doubtful
150
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that the courts would rule likewise in immigration matters; still, cases do
arise resting on equitable principles and reflecting the same underlying
interests (for example, protecting the sanctity of the family) as those set
forth in Moore. This is best seen in deportation matters: In Antoine-Dorcetli
v. INS,iX for example, it was held that the deportation of a Haitian woman
who had lived with a US family from the age of 7 and later became a
family servant should be suspended, given the nature of her relationship
to the family. Because the petitioner considered herself a family member
for approximately 30 years, her separation would result in an 'extreme
hardship' in that her 'true and only family relationship' was with the US
family.157
Dorcelti is unquestionably a unique case, but it illustrates the extent to
which family and family ties can be relevant in this area. When the
question of relief from deportation of a family member is at issue, the
relationship is more closely examined. Current immigration law requires,
among others, a showing of'family ties within the United States', 'residence
of long duration in the US' and 'evidence of hardship', for either the
deportee or his or her family members who would be left behind, before
granting relief.158 US law in this area explicitly reflects a concern for the
whole family, contrasting with the Strasbourg cases noted above, which
tend to focus on individual roots developed in a country of residence and
often ignore the repercussions for the rest of the family. Perhaps this is
an area where the European Court and Commission can learn from the
US approach.
Otherwise, however, cases regarding US family immigration matters
are similar to the European cases described above. US courts also
scrutinize family ties and determine if they are sufficiently close such that
a forced separation would unreasonably burden the family relationship.
As seen above, family ties weigh heavily in deportation matters, and there
is a similar tendency to balance State and individual interests. Serious
crimes, including certain classes of crimes involving 'moral turpitude' or
drug related offences, may tip the scales and result in a denial of relief
from an order of deportation.159 In Gouveia v. INS,m a petitioner, who
had previously pleaded guilty to rape and indecent assault, sought relief
from a deportation order based on a number of 'positive equities',
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including his long term family ties, steady employment and lengthy
residency in the US. These were considered insufficient to overbalance
the criminality involved, particularly because of the 'heinous nature' of
the crimes committed, his deportation was upheld. Thus, as in Europe,
an interference with family life is justified where a prevailing State interest
(article 8(2)) is found to be legitimate. Finally, as shown below, the tension
between individual rights and the plenary power doctrine is a dominating
feature in these matters, a characteristic comparable to the conflict
between individual and State in European Law.
3.3 Plenary power and the approach of the US courts: The
substance-procedure distinction
Outside die immigration realm, the constitutional rights of aliens are
determined in a manner similar to those of citizens. With respect to
procedural due process rights, US Courts have traditionally indicated
that even in immigration matters, they 'would not totally abandon their
role as guardians of aliens' rights'.1*1' Thus there remains a grey area in
which the rights of aliens in immigration matters may still be deserving
of judicial review and of constitutional protection equal to that of citizens.
Where procedural due process rights have been violated, there is an
exception to the plenary power doctrine which allows for judicial review
and the application of a 'strict scrutiny' test for determining whether or
not a given procedure violates due process. On the other hand, a less
stringent standard of review — a 'rational basis' test — is applied in
immigration matters involving substantive due process violations.162
Two fairly recent cases illustrate the reasoning followed in the
application of these tests. Both involved decisions pursuant to section 5(b)
of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments (IMFA), which provides
that aliens who marry US citizens during the pendency of a deportation
proceeding must reside out of the US for two years before a petition for
immediate relative status will be considered by the INS.
In Manwani v. US Department of Justice, Z/V51,'63 the petitioners, a US
citizen and her foreign husband, challenged the constitutionality of this
provision. The couple had married during deportation proceedings against
the husband for overstaying his visa, as a result of which he was required
to reside outside the US for the two-year period. The court ruled that
the statute, as applied to these petitioners, invoked procedural due process
161
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rights warranting judicial review and the application of a strict scrutiny
standard of review. A lengthy analysis of the difference between substantive
and procedural classifications ensued. The court compared Hallo, noting
the distinction drawn there between statutes which 'set forth categories
of familial relationships' and those which 'establish procedures designed
to prevent circumvention of lawful admission requirements,' die latter
being subject to strict constitutional scrutiny.164 As applied here, section
5(b) was found to penalize the exercise of a fundamental right, namely,
the right to marry. Compelling diese plaintiffs to reside elsewhere would
'interfere with (their) ability to have a family and . . . impose enormous
and unwarranted hardships on their marriage'.165
The Manwani Court was unusually liberal in more than one respect.
It disagreed with a previous line of cases which held that a citizen-spouse
did not have a constitutional right to have his or her alien spouse remain
in the US and maintained, instead, that such reasoning ignored the basic
issue of whether a 'protected interest' was 'burdened' by section 5(b):
Restrictions on marriage are subject to the most exacting scrutiny. A governmental
burden on the right to marry need not amount to an absolute prohibition in
order to constitute an impermissible interference with marital association.166
Finally, the court noted that section 5(b) also resulted in a deprivation of
Ms. Manwani's property right to the immediate relative status of her
spouse. Pursuant to statute, once the INS finds that a marriage between
an alien and a citizen is bona fide, it is obligated to grant immediate
relative status.167 Because section 5(b) interfered with this right without
allowing for a hearing, there was a further violation of due process
because of a lack of'constitutionally adequate procedures'.16"
Azizi v. Thomburgh, a case with a similar fact pattern, was decided by
the US Court of Appeals in the same year as Manwani.m Here, the court
interpreted section 5(b) as substantive and thus subject only to a rational
basis review. The requirement that the alien live out of the US for two
years was found to be 'rationally related' to Congress's goal of eliminating
marriage fraud and was thus upheld against a constitutional challenge.
Since the provision created a substantive as opposed to a procedural
classification, the alien plaintiff was not entided to a hearing with respect
164
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to the loss of his immediate relative status. As in Fialb, the court followed
the 'limited judicial scrutiny' line of reasoning.
Critics of Azizi have maintained that because section 5(b) prolongs the
assertion of a statutory right, it is procedural and thus deserving of the
same treatment as in Manwani:
The Azizis sought to protect the right to immediate relative status specifically
granted by the INA to bona fide spouses. The court should have acknowledged
that the provision implicated previously protected liberty interests of the right
to marital association and of the right of a US citizen to remain in the US. A
better analysis would hold 5(b) unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny standard.170
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Cardamone also stressed the procedural
nature of the statute. Among other things, he noted that there was an
'unconstitutional burden on the right to marry' and that the statute's
potential for avoiding fraud was doubtful.171
As the above cases illustrate, the determination of whether an alleged
violation is substantive or procedural is difficult. Section 5(b), for example,
may be labelled substantive as it is a decision which excludes certain
aliens from a right to permanent residency; however, it may also be
procedural because it has the effect of significandy delaying a hearing.172
Thus in many immigration cases, a given classification may be
characterized as substantive or procedural and the way in which an alleged
violation is categorized will afTect its possibility for passing constitutional
muster. As one author notes with respect to practice:
Lawyers for aliens understand that a procedural label greatly enhances the
likelihood that a constitutional challenge to an immigration procedure will
succeed. Government lawyers fight for a substantive label to bring a case squarely
under the plenary power doctrine, thereby taking full advantage of the political
branches' immunity from constitutional challenges.173
The general approach of US courts in this area of the law has drawn much
scholarly attention: 'The plenary power doctrine has eroded significandy in
the past few decades and the evolution of procedural due process as an
exception to plenary power has been a critical part of this trend'.174
Nevertheless, courts continue to review substantive claims with a rational
basis test in many immigration cases, and the government is usually the
victor when this is applied. Immigration law has been criticized as lacking
a 'fully developed core of substantive constitutional rights of the type mat
has long existed by way of judicial review of substantive claims in
170
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mainstream constitutional law'."5 The problem is best summarized by
Motomura in an article analyzing the development of immigration laws
under the plenary power doctrine:
Immigration law, as it has developed over the past one hundred years under
the domination of die plenary power doctrine, represents an aberrational form
of the typical relationship between statutory interpretation and constitutional law.
The aberrant quality is attributable to the prolonged nature of the contradiction
between the two sets of 'constitutional norms' in immigration law. The
constitutional norms that the courts use when they direcdy decide constitutional
issues in immigration cases are not the same constitutional norms that inform
interpretation of immigration statutes. To serve the latter function, many courts
have relied on . . . 'phantom constitutional norms' which are not indigenous to
immigration law but come from mainstream public law instead. The result has
been to undermine the plenary power doctrine through statutory interpretation.l7b
4. Conclusion
Case law, treaties, legislative intent and the basic principles regarding
family unification give credence to the family as an essential institution
deeply rooted in the moral fibre of society and indicate a clear concern
for both its preservation and promotion. Despite the lack of a unified
approach to a right to family unity, similarities in interpretation in both
the US and Europe reveal its nature as a right based in privacy and
concerned with the freedom to develop and maintain close personal
relationships that fall within a particular legal framework. Similarities
also reveal that the right to lead a 'normal' family life requires non- (or
at least minimal) interference by the State. It is with this latter requirement
that a problem begins: As this article has shown, the conflict between
State and individual interests pervades all family immigration issues.
Although it is not overt, the question underlying most cases is where the
line must be drawn between these competing interests.
The conflict is best seen in the application of the plenary power and
State sovereignty doctrines simultaneously with the recognition of a basic
right to family unity. This results in a tension in the law which is in
critical need of resolution. In effect, the doctrines constitute a burden on
the full exercise of the right to family unity in immigration matters. That
the same right is treated differendy outside the immigration sphere is
increasingly difficult to tolerate in the face of a growing need for family
reunification rights. Consider, for example, the difference between the
treatment of the right to family unity by the United States Supreme
' " Ibid., at 1698.
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Court in Moore111 and the family immigration cases. In the latter, the
'sanctity of the family', with all its historical and traditional roots, as well
as the due process aspects of the basic right to family unity, is diminished
by the plenary power doctrine. Similarly, in family immigration cases
under article 8 ECHR, an interference with the basic right to family
unity is characterized as one which prevents enjoyment of that right
elsewhere, as opposed to an outright limitation which would follow from
an interference with any other basic right.
Notions such as procedural due process and positive obligations play
an important role in family immigration cases by getting around the
shortcomings of the older doctrines and by adding flexibility to the law.
However, as these notions continue to be applied, the older doctrines
need to be re-evaluated and adjusted to meet current realities.178 As the
case law shows, the procedural due process and positive obligation analysis
also have their drawbacks. The substantive-procedural distinction in US
case law tends to be ambiguous, particularly where the plenary power
doctrine is relevant. The different results in the Manuiani and Aztij. cases
reveals a varying interpretation of the reach of the same constitutional
rights, indicating the need to reconcile the power to remove matters from
judicial review with the increasing recognition that families have a due
process right to unification.
Problems with the positive obligation approach arise in establishing its
scope. The point at which a State is obligated to act affirmatively to
protect the right to family unity is unclear. Moreover, the interpretation
of this notion also has a potential for ambiguity. The partly dissenting
opinion ofjudge Matscher in the Marckxczisc is illustrative of this potential
where he notes that the positive obligation notion of article 8 'is limited
to what is necessary for the creation and development of family life
according to the ideas which contemporary European societies have of
this concept'."9 Such standards leave much in the hands of individual
judicial opinion.
Another concept in need of re-working, or perhaps even elimination,
is the 'elsewhere approach'. Because its effect can pose extreme hardship
by requiring an individual to leave his or her country of origin, or a
country where he or she is well-established, it has been criticized as
'incompatible with effective human rights protection'.180 There are also
numerous additional problems. Whether it is reasonable to expect a
' " Moore, 431 US 494.
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family to move to another country is extremely difficult to resolve and
clearly subject to varying judicial opinion. Thus far, application of the
test has burdened the European Court by giving it an extra role as a
'regulator of migration of couples from a State with deterrent immigration
policies to a State where these policies are not so stringent'.181 Yet another
difficulty is how to proceed when all States employ the test. Where do
you send a family when all States involved find interests are best served
by moving them elsewhere? Finally, pursuant to the European procedure
for determining whether there has been an interference with the right to
family unity, the 'elsewhere test' is an extra balancing test. The balancing
of interests involved in determining whedier a given interference is justified
is sufficient; requiring a second balancing test places an undue burden
on those seeking to exercise their right to family unity.
The 'elsewhere' approach concerns an issue fundamental to the right
to family unity under both US and European law; it has further
implications for the basic right to marry, namely, how effectively to
protect the rights of couples of different nationalities. As one author
suggests, the only practical solution is to allow these couples to exercise
their right to family unity in both States within the confines of article
8(2) of the Convention or similar domestic provisions.182 To avoid outright
country-choosing, consideration of an individual's connections to a State
should remain relevant. Connections are also important for humanitarian
reasons; forcing a person to leave a country in which he or she has spent
most of their life and return to a country to in which there are no real
or substantial ties is an extremely severe punishment that may not only
interfere with, but also destroy family life.
In all family immigration cases the actual family situation should be
the ultimate determining factor if the right to family life is to be protected
and maintained. Whether there is a family life and whether it will be
burdened or destroyed by a separation are issues to be dealt with at the
outset, in view of the consequences for both the individual and the family.
Thereafter, or perhaps even simultaneously, connections must also be
considered as these play an essential role in establishing and defining the
broader context of family life within a given culture.
With the recent changes in immigration patterns and the growing
numbers of immigrants worldwide, family immigration cases are likely to
increase. As this occurs, care must be taken to avoid any greater
interference with the right to family unity than necessary. The conflict
of interests and other problems inherent in the exercise of the right cannot
be eliminated overnight. However, much can be done by way of re-
evaluating some older procedures and by developing clearer standards
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and definitions. Among other things, it is imperative that a closer look
be taken at the role of the plenary power and State sovereignty doctrines
in cases where families have been or are in danger of being separated.
These doctrines are not likely to be abandoned in the near future as,
among odier things, they are essential to the preservation of State
autonomy. However, the role assigned to them must be adjusted to
accommodate the right to family unity. Where the right has been (or is
in danger of being) violated, the role played by these doctrines must be
minimized. Due process and positive obligations must be given precedence
over deference to State sovereignty and plenary power. Furthermore, the
value of maintaining the 'elsewhere approach' as a means of determining
whether or not there has been an interference with the right to family
unity in the European cases must be appraised in light of its many
complications. As some recent case law has demonstrated, this approach
is becoming obsolete because of the increasing recognition of the
importance of the family in society. It is the family that is guaranteed
protection, and we must not lose sight of the fact that die focal point for
determining if there has been a violation of the right must be the family,
and not the individual.
Family immigration cases today have taken on new dimensions, and
the current legal framework for addressing these matters is in transition.
The more recent emphasis on due process rights instead of plenary power
and on positive obligations instead of sovereignty or the 'elsewhere
approach', together with the recent second generation migrant cases in
Europe, all indicate a liberal trend in the law which should be encouraged
and broadened in order to preserve the full exercise of the right to family
unity, and to maintain a humanistic quality in this area of the law.
